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21. Introduction
Recently, philosophers of biology have engaged in a lively debate over the status of the
evolutionary process: is evolution deterministic or indeterministic?  The thread of the current
discussion seems to have begun in 1984 with Elliott Sober 1984 arguing that macro-level
evolutionary phenomena were not safe from micro-level indeterminism.  In response, Alex
Rosenberg (1988, 1994) and Barbara Horan (1994) argued against Sober and for the determinism
of evolution.  However, it is with the publishing of Robert Brandon and Scott Carson’s full-
fledged defense of evolutionary indeterminism that the debate seems to have kicked into high
gear (Brandon and Carson 1996; hereafter BC).  BC’s paper inspired Leslie Graves, Horan, and
Rosenberg to join forces and write a response defending "asymptotic" determinism (Graves,
Horan, and Rosenberg 1999; hereafter GHR).  Most recently, evolutionary indeterminists have
struck back with a pair of papers by David Stamos (2001) and Bruce Glymour (2001).  These
two essays have persuaded one of the determinists, Rosenberg, to concede that the evolutionary
process is “indeterministic in at least some of its most important fundamental processes” (2001,
536).1  So, is the debate over?  Have the indeterminists won?  Not quite yet, I will argue.
Before beginning, I should come clean with my own views on this debate.  I am neither an
evolutionary determinist nor an evolutionary indeterminist, having argued previously that the
appropriate position to take on this issue is one of agnosticism (Millstein 2000).  Moreover,
unlike Rosenberg, I have not been persuaded by Stamos and Glymour to change my position.
However, agnosticism will not be my specific argument in this essay, although I will address
                                                
1 Contrast this quote with Rosenberg’s earlier remarks: “…it appears to be reasonable to conclude that, like
mechanical phenomena, evolutionary phenomena are after all deterministic, or at least as deterministic as underlying
quantum indeterminism will allow” (1994, 82).  However, he has not conceded the related claim, made by BC, that
3some of the same issues that I have before.  Instead, I want to illustrate some of the difficulties in
finding a resolution to this debate, and to show why Stamos and Glymour do not settle the issue.
Then briefly, at the end of my essay, I will suggest how the debate might be resolved, if it is to
be resolved.
Although ultimately my focus is on the arguments by Stamos and Glymour, I will spend
some time discussing BC and GHR.  I think the case can be made that it is primarily these two
papers that have set the terms of the current debate.  In order to characterize this debate, we will
need some rough definitions.  Let us take determinism to be the view that given the complete
state of the world at one point in time, the state of the world at every future point in time is
uniquely determined.  We will take, indeterminism, on the other hand, to be the view that, given
the complete state of the world at one point in time, the state of the world at every future point in
time is not uniquely determined; for a given point of time in the future, more than one state is
possible.2  Now let us take a scientific realist to be someone (a philosopher, scientist, or
layperson) who accepts the probable truth of theories that are well-supported by evidence, and a
scientific realist about quantum mechanics (QM) to be someone who accepts the claim that QM
implies indeterminism at the micro-level.
Given these definitions, the question that emerges from BC and GHR is: if you are a
scientific realist, and a scientific realist about QM in particular, should you believe that the
evolutionary process is indeterministic?3  The “if” clause here is crucial – the entire debate
                                                                                                                                                            
the probabilities of evolutionary theory are fundamental propensities, a claim that I discuss elsewhere (Millstein,
forthcoming).
2 I am not particularly wedded to the wording here; the key point is that the definitions of determinism and
indeterminism are ontological rather than epistemological.
3 Parts of BC’s arguments do not rely explicitly on a realist stance towards QM, as will be discussed further below;
however, Brandon states these arguments do “not commit us the truth, or even the sensibility, of the following
counterfactual: If quantum mechanics were deterministic then the evolutionary process would still be
indeterministic.  I for one have no idea how to evaluate the truth of that statement” (ms.).
4assumes scientific realism and the reality of quantum probabilities.  As BC emphasize, the
arguments would not be convincing to someone who was a scientific instrumentalist in general,
for reasons outside of this debate.  BC’s answer to the above question is “yes”; GHR answer
“no”.
However, that is not the only point of disagreement; there is also disagreement over the
related question as to how to interpret the use of probabilities in evolutionary theory.  According
to GHR, the probabilities used in evolutionary theory are purely epistemic ones.4  According to
BC, even if it turns out that evolution is a deterministic process, the probabilities used in the
theory are not merely epistemic, but are explanatory of genuine phenomena.
Although these authors treat the two issues in concert, in this essay I will consider only the
former question of the determinism or indeterminism of the evolutionary process in order to give
due weight to the answer.  The question of the proper interpretation of probability for
evolutionary theory is interesting and important,5 but it is partially dependent on the
determinism/indeterminism question.  Specifically, if the evolutionary process is deterministic,
then some interpretations of probability are ruled out, most notably fundamental propensity
(although there are propensity interpretations that are consistent with determinism).  On the other
hand, if the evolutionary process is indeterministic, almost any interpretation of probability
would be appropriate, but fundamental propensity will play at least some role.  So, answering the
determinism/indeterminism question is a necessary step in answering the interpretation-of-
probability question.
Furthermore, the determinism/indeterminism question is interesting and important in its
own right, and not only because the answer tells us something about the nature of our reality.
                                                
4 Rosenberg has since recanted this view (2001).
5For example, Gould has argued that if we could “replay the tape of life” that humans might not
evolve a second time (Gould 1989).  But what does this claim mean?  Does it mean only that,
given different initial conditions, humans might not have evolved, or does it mean something
stronger – that even given the same conditions, humans might not have evolved?  (Gould seems
to have intended the former, weaker claim).  If the evolutionary process is indeterministic, the
stronger claim is warranted; if deterministic, only, perhaps, the weaker.  Another example is the
perennial issue of human “free will”.  To the extent that indeterminism is relevant to this issue
(not unproblematically, as has been amply discussed elsewhere), indeterminism of the
evolutionary process is going to be more relevant than indeterminism of quantum phenomena
alone.
So, given the terms of the debate as I have described them above, there are two basic
strategies by which one might seek to argue for indeterminism, as Stamos and Glymour do.  The
first is to focus on the implications of QM for evolution, and to argue that the indeterministic
micro-level percolates up to the macro-level.  This is the strategy that Stamos uses.  The second
strategy largely ignores the implications of QM, and argues for the indeterminism of evolution
on independent (autonomous) grounds.  This is primarily (although not solely) the strategy that
Glymour uses.  I will examine each of these strategies in turn.
2. The Percolation Strategy
Again, both sides of the debate assume that micro-level phenomena are fundamentally
indeterministic.  However, the question remains as to whether the quantum mechanical
                                                                                                                                                            
5 See Millstein (forthcoming) for discussion of this issue.
6indeterminism of the micro-level can “percolate up” to the macro-level described by
evolutionary biology.  The percolation argument, formulated by Sober and endorsed by BC,
concludes that the micro-level can percolate up to the level of evolutionary processes.  As Sober
states:
If enough elementary particles had behaved differently, the behavior of the macro-object
(the organism, the population) that they compose would have also been different.  And
there is no deterministic guarantee that the ensemble of particles must have behaved the
way it did.  The most that the ensembles of particles we call organisms can do is exhibit
an impressive degree of predictability.  But, so long as they are made of particles that
have an irreducible chance component in their behavior, they too must be indeterministic
systems.  If chance is real at the micro-level, it must be real at the macro-level as well
(1984, 121; italics in original).
It is important to recognize that the percolation argument is not denied outright by
determinists.  GHR admit “it is not in principle impossible that quantum indeterminacy might
occasionally alter a biological outcome” (145).  Thus, the determinists concede that it is possible
that micro-level indeterminacy can percolate up to the evolutionary macro-level.  However, they
argue that it is extraordinarily unlikely; by the time we reach the macro-level of evolutionary
processes, the world is essentially deterministic.  I will refer to this as the “asymptotic
determinism” argument.
Rosenberg has recently offered a useful clarification of the asymptotic determinism
argument:
7For example, Newtonian mechanics suitably restricted to the description of the behavior
of macroscopic objects over finite periods of time only, will be instantiated by the
histories of many possible worlds–including the actual world–in which (indeterministic)
quantum mechanics obtains, but in which the probabilities of the violation of Newton’s
laws by macroscopic objects are so low that there is not a single actual violation in the
amount of time taken up by the whole history of the possible world in question.  That the
actual world is such a world is what GHR had in mind in claiming that quantum
phenomena asymptotically approach determinism in almost all biologically significant
processes (2001, 537-8; italics in original).
Stuart Glennan offers an everyday example of asymptotic determinism in his observation that in
spite of micro-level indeterminism, “pushing the button on a Coke machine deterministically
produces a Coke” (1997, 498).  Glennan points out that even when pushing the button doesn’t
produce a Coke, this is due to a failure of the mechanism of the Coke machine and is not an
indeterministic phenomenon (1997, 515, n. 3).
In one sense, these two opposing arguments–indeterministic percolation versus asymptotic
determinism–are not in conflict at all; it is possible to believe simultaneously that the micro-level
can percolate up to the evolutionary macro-level, while claiming that this almost never happens
(since we have asymptotically approached determinism).
However, there is a certain amount of conflict between the two arguments, and this seems
to have to do with the frequency of percolations.  The asymptotic determinism argument implies
that percolation almost never occurs, whereas the percolation argument implies that percolation
8occurs, if not frequently, then somewhat more frequently than “almost never.”  Or perhaps
“almost never” is stating the asymptotic determinism position too strongly – GHR are willing to
concede “that quantum indeterminism might occasionally alter a biological outcome” (145;
emphasis added).  On the other hand, when BC argue for the indeterminism of evolution, they
are not talking about a phenomenon that occurs rarely, or even occasionally, but rather, a
phenomenon as common as two cloned plants that are raised in identical conditions, yet have
different numbers of flowers (329).
Thus, the terms of the debate (via the percolation strategy), as set by BC on the one hand,
and Graves, Horan and Rosenberg on the other, are fairly vague.  It is unclear how many
“percolations” would have to occur before we would consider our world to be fundamentally
indeterministic.  I think that the debate has been cast in such vague terms because the logically
possible extreme positions–complete determinism or complete indeterminism–are implausible.
On the other hand, what is interesting to us is the degree to which evolution is indeterministic.
And there is a substantive difference between an evolutionary process that is rarely
indeterministic and an evolutionary process that is frequently or commonly indeterministic.
However, casting the debate in these vague terms means that it will be difficult, although perhaps
not impossible, to settle.
What would make the debate impossible to settle is if were kept it in these purely abstract
terms – if one simply asked how frequently micro-level indeterminism percolates up to the
macro-level.  To answer “frequently” or “very rarely” is simply to trade one philosophical
intuition for another.  The observable world contains numerous phenomena that appear
deterministic and numerous phenomena that appear indeterministic.  Without the demonstration
of a concrete example, there is no good reason to prefer one intuition over the other.  (I will refer
9to this abstract trading of intuitions over percolation as the "percolation fallacy").  Perhaps in
recognition of this point, BC present a concrete example where a quantum mutation would have
a population-level effect – a percolation to the macro-level.
In BC’s example, there is a population consisting of two haploid genotypes, A and a.  The
population has an unstable equilibrium point when the population is composed of equal numbers
of A’s and a’s; one mutation from a to A would cause the population to consist entirely of A’s,
whereas a mutation from A to a would cause the population to consist entirely of a's.  Thus, if
some mutations are quantum events, it is clear that this would be a case where quantum effects
would percolate up to the level of evolutionary processes.
Unfortunately, this is only one example, and it leaves one wondering if similar arguments
could be made with other kinds of examples.  In addition, as BC admit, the example is
unrealistic.  In fact, the very thing that makes the example persuasive – the unstable equilibrium
point that leads to the dramatic shift in the composition of the population – is what makes it
unrealistic.  As BC note, we would not expect to find such populations in nature because random
drift would likely push the population from the point where the two genotypes were of equal
frequency.  Thus, because BC’s example is only one example, and because it is an unrealistic
example, it does not go very far in settling the question of how often percolations occur.  It
certainly does not seem to bump us very far from the “almost never” category and into the “more
frequently” category (again, the terms of the debate are vague, so it is difficult to know when it
has been settled).
It should be noted that BC do not intend the percolation argument to be their primary
argument for the indeterminism of the evolutionary process (and this will be discussed further
below).  They are more concerned with autonomous indeterminism than they are with
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indeterminism simpliciter:  “For ET to be autonomously indeterministic it must be
indeterministic in a way that does not depend on QM” (BC, 320).  It certainly would be an
interesting result if evolution turned out to be indeterministic, completely independently of
quantum theory.  However, I think the question of whether evolution is non-autonomously
indeterministic is interesting and important in its own right.  In other words, in one sense, I take
BC’s percolation argument to be more important than they do; I think that the kind of argument
that they give has the potential to settle the debate, even if I don’t think that this particular
argument succeeds.
 GHR offer additional criticisms of BC’s example, but rather than considering those
criticisms directly, I will address Stamos's response to them.  Stamos (2001) identifies five
reasons that GHR give for thinking that BC’s example is highly improbable: 1) BC need to
defend their assertion that the processes creating point mutations are indeterministic, 2) the
number of bases of relatively small genes (let alone large genes) is too large for spontaneous
mutations to have anything but a negligible effect, 3) the genetic code is redundant, 4) many
amino acid substitutions in proteins result in little if any difference in function, and 5) a point
mutation could be canceled out by additional random events.
Of these five reasons, only four are really directed at the claim that BC’s example is
improbable (namely, reasons 2, 3, 4, and 5 above).  Stamos provides counterarguments to these
four reasons.  These counterarguments are quite persuasive, although they are not conclusive,
because even if Stamos were to succeed in defending BC’s example, the debate will still not be
settled, for the reasons that I just mentioned–it is only one example, and it is an unrealistic
example.6  Thus, I will not give any further discussion of these four counterarguments.
                                                
6 In addition, he does not address GHR’s general reasons for endorsing asymptotic determinism.
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In any case, the primary focus of Stamos’s arguments is not against GHR’s claim that BC’s
example is improbable.  Instead, Stamos focuses in particular on GHR’s suggestion, made in a
footnote, that point mutations may not be indeterministic (reason 1 above).  GHR state:
Of course, saying that point mutations are caused by quantum activity is not the same
thing as saying that point mutations instantiate quantum indeterminacy.  Consider the
shape and complexity of an [adenine] molecule.  The changes required to mutate this
molecule into a guanine molecule will be quite considerable, clearly involving a
substantial aggregation of micro-processes.  Because the outcome of micro-events
aggregating to this extent is asymptotically deterministic at even the level of macro-
physical processes, BC’s assertion that the processes creating point mutation are
indeterministic is an assumption very much in need of defense (144, n. 7).
So Stamos defends the assumption–and defends it well.  After numerous papers in which
philosophers have glossed over the indeterminacy of point mutations, Stamos gives us a detailed,
biologically sophisticated explanation of why point mutations are indeterministic.  I cannot do
justice to it here, but in short, he examines several candidate mechanisms for point mutations
(discussing controversies over different proposed mechanisms), and illustrates how the different
mechanisms “hook up” to quantum mechanical processes (Stamos 2001).  It is a compelling and
convincing argument, and it is a genuine contribution to the philosophical literature, filling in a
yawning gap.  However, it does not settle the question of whether evolution is largely
deterministic or indeterministic.  Or so I will argue.
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As I noted already, most of Stamos’s essay is a response to GHR’s footnote.  Now it is true
that some philosophers (who I will decline to name) are notorious for sneaking their most
important points into the footnotes, but I don’t believe that is what GHR have done.  It is clear
from the rest of their essay that they largely grant the indeterminism of point mutations (and the
earlier essays by Horan and Rosenberg support this interpretation as well).  That is not what’s at
stake between the two sides.  What is at stake is whether (and to what extent) point mutations
produce an effect at the level of evolutionary processes.  BC’s example addresses this issue
directly, by describing a scenario where a point mutation has an immediate evolutionary effect.
But for the most part, Stamos does not discuss the implications of point mutation for evolution;
instead, he focuses on demonstrating that point mutations are indeterministic.  This fills in an
essential point in BC’s percolation argument, but again, BC’s percolation argument does not
settle the debate (nor was it intended to, as discussed above).
My response to Stamos may seem odd here.  After all, no one doubts that mutation plays an
important role in evolution.  So, if point mutations are indeterministic, then evolution must be
indeterministic also, right?  This seems to be Stamos’s implicit argument.  Yet I do not think the
implicit argument succeeds.
To see why not, we must consider the role that mutation, in general, plays in the
evolutionary process.  Mutation can be viewed from two different perspectives in evolution.
First, it can be seen as an evolutionary process, alongside other evolutionary processes such as
natural selection, random drift, and migration.  That is, when there is a mutation in a population,
there is a change in the genetic composition of the population–in other words, there is evolution,
at least according to some definitions of it.  However, when you consider mutation in this light,
its effects are very weak as compared to natural selection, random drift, and migration.  So, any
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indeterministic contribution would be small.  Viewed from the second perspective, mutation is a
source of variation that the other processes (natural selection, random drift, and migration) act on
and amplify.  Here one sees that the role of mutation in evolution is a key one, although mutation
is not the only source of phenotypic variation; recombination is also a source of a considerable
amount of phenotypic variation in a population.  More importantly, not all variations due to
mutation result in a long-term evolutionary effect; many are immediately lost to selection or
drift.
Furthermore, we must consider that not all mutations are point mutations (i.e., base
substitutions).  Other kinds of mutations include deletions, insertions, inversions, translocations,
and gene conversions (Hartl and Clark 1989, 97-103).  This is not to say that Stamos makes the
mistake of saying that all mutations are point mutations, but just to clarify that the previous
points made about mutation concern phenomena of which point mutations are just a subset.  We
would need an additional paper (or papers!) akin to Stamos’s, to convince us that all of these
forms of mutation are indeterministic.
When you consider all these points together: that mutation as an evolutionary process has
weak effects, that mutation as a source of variation is often not perpetuated, and that not all
mutations are point mutations, the right conclusion to be drawn seems to be that point mutations
do contribute a certain amount of indeterminism to the evolutionary process, but they do not
make it indeterministic to any great degree.  Or, at least, it is not obvious that they do; more
argument would be needed to demonstrate this claim.  Now of course, all of this is quite vague;
but once again, the terms of the debate, as set by BC and GHR, are quite vague.  Consequently,
the questions become: can the indeterminist show that evolution is largely indeterministic, or can
the determinist show that evolution is not largely indeterministic?  Stamos has not addressed
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these questions.  Therefore, although Stamos’s demonstration that point mutations are
indeterministic supports a key point of BC’s, it does not settle the debate in favor of the
percolation argument for indeterminism.
3. The Autonomous Strategy
The second strategy by which one might argue for the indeterminism of evolution does not
look to QM to undergird the argument, but instead argues directly for the indeterminism of
higher level evolutionary processes.  In this strategy, QM plays a role that is at best peripheral,
perhaps opening the door for the possibility of indeterminism.  However, since no explicit
connection is made, it can be said that evolution is treated autonomously.
BC use this strategy in their example of experiments on cloned organisms.  As BC note,
experimental setups that use cloned organisms in controlled environmental settings are quite
common in biology.  The results are equally commonplace: organisms that are (purportedly)
genetically identical and are raised in (purportedly) identical environments will differ physically,
so that some will be more reproductively successful than others.  For example, cloned plants
grown in identical environments may have different heights and weights, or different numbers of
flowers, leading to differential reproductive success.  BC argue that these kinds of experiments
are evidence for the indeterminism of evolution.
Glymour’s (2001) arguments primarily follow the same autonomous strategy of arguing
from a higher level process, i.e., an evolutionary process, although he uses the percolation
strategy as well.  For the moment, I will focus on his use of the autonomous strategy.  Like
Stamos’s essay, Glymour’s essay is biologically sophisticated, philosophically interesting, and a
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genuine contribution to the literature.  And as with Stamos’s essay, my summary of Glymour
will not do it justice; I will be simplifying his discussion considerably.  Glymour examines the
phenomenon of random foraging behavior, as it has been observed in bluegill sunfish and the
parasitoid wasp.  Glymour demonstrates that when foraging, these organisms use a random
search strategy, as opposed to a systematic strategy; their behavior can also be described as a
random walk.
Moreover, if I understand Glymour correctly, he is suggesting that not only are the paths
random (rather than systematic), but that they are generated randomly; that is, the organisms do
not follow the same nonsystematic path each time, but a different nonsystematic path is
generated each time.  Glymour seems to be suggesting that this random generation of random
patterns is evidence for the indeterminism of the foraging process.  Glymour then makes the case
that foraging search paths affect both energy expended and the number of prey captured, and are
thus subject to natural selection (presumably, on the assumption that search path behavior is
heritable).  Therefore, he concludes, there is evidence that evolution is at least sometimes
indeterministic.  (Glymour thus succeeds in tying his argument to evolution, whereas as we saw
above, Stamos fails to do this).
So, to put the point simply, in both BC’s and Glymour’s arguments, a random pattern is
identified at the evolutionary level, and a case is made that indeterminism is the best explanation
for the random pattern.  Both essays acknowledge the obvious counterargument, that the patterns
could be the result of determinism in conjunction with hidden variables.  In BC’s example, a
determinist can maintain that either the organisms were not truly identical (a mistake occurred
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during the cloning process),7 or the environments were not truly identical (a mistake was made
in constructing the environmental settings).  Now, in Glymour’s example, we would need to
know more about the causal factors that give rise to foraging behavior in order to decide which
hidden variables are plausible (if any).  Again, however, deterministic hidden variables are at
least in principle possible.
“Random” functions in computer programs provide a useful analogy here.8  Most computer
languages contain a random function, often called “rand”.  Suppose a program is run that calls
the function “rand” ten times, producing a sequence of ten numbers.  Each time the program is
run, the same sequence of ten numbers would be repeated – which is not terribly random!
However, “rand” functions can be fed what is called a “seed.”  Different “seeds” produce
different sequences.  Let us now suppose that each time we run our program, the “seed” used is
the time on the computer’s clock (or better yet, the duration between keystrokes on a keyboard,
which is difficult to reproduce).  Now each time the program is run, a different sequence of ten
numbers is produced.  By all appearances, the pattern of sequences is random.  Of course, it is
not really random; the program is deterministic, and, more specifically, the sequence is specified
by the seed.  But that is exactly the point.  A pattern can look random and yet be the result of a
completely deterministic process.  Indeed, random foraging patterns can be generated by
deterministic computer programs.  An observed random pattern is not sufficient evidence for
indeterminism.
Thus, the basic problem with the autonomous strategy is that when you have random data
patterns (even random data patterns generated randomly), it is possible to account for the data in
                                                
7   Lewontin states: “Given the known rates of mutation, the likelihood that two actually existing genomes are
identical over their entireties is extremely low, even for those of identical twins or other clonally reproduced
organisms” (1992, 139).
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two ways.  The random data patterns may be the result of an indeterministic process, or the
random data patterns may be the result of a deterministic process in conjunction with one or
more hidden variables.  The challenge then becomes how to argue for one position without
begging the question against the other position.
BC’s response to this challenge is to assert that one should only posit a hidden
deterministic variable if it aids in the development of the theory; however, “the positing of
deterministic hidden variables in evolutionary theory serves no theoretical purpose at all” (331).
GHR attempt to counter this claim by suggesting that it is the positing of deterministic hidden
variables that provides the impetus to seek out additional causes, and that “to do otherwise is to
abdicate the scientist’s self-appointed tasks” (153).  However, as both Stamos and Glymour point
out, an indeterminist can still seek out hidden variables for some of the apparent randomness,
with the understanding that some randomness will remain due to fundamental indeterminism.
What this exchange between the determinists and the indeterminists illustrates is that there
are really two issues here.  The first issue is whether it is ever useful to think that there may be
hidden factors producing a random pattern.  Here, both indeterminists and determinists seem to
grant that sometimes it is useful to think there are deterministic hidden variables – but when?
When it aids in the development of the theory, as BC suggest?  But how could we know that in
advance?  It seems to me that (at best) it is only in retrospect that we can say whether a search
for particular hidden variables has been a waste of time.  The second issue is the more general
one of whether there is some sort of methodological advantage to being a determinist or an
indeterminist.  However, it is hard to see what that would be.  Furthermore, it is not at all clear
that biologists (now or in the past) have ontological conceptions of determinism or
                                                                                                                                                            
8 These are often called "pseudo-random" functions, for reasons that will become clear.
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indeterminism in mind when they develop evolutionary theory.  I do not think methodology will
tell us whether to prefer a deterministic or an indeterministic account of a random pattern.
Glymour, on the other hand, addresses the issue of accounting for a random pattern
deterministically by stating that, “[w]e would have reason to take this possibility seriously, that
is, to doubt that random search behavior is genuinely random, if it were simply impossible for
organisms to exploit indeterministic features of their own physiology or environment in
generating search behavior” (2001, 526).  He then proceeds to motivate the claim that
indeterministic behavioral mechanisms are possible.  However, this response is not persuasive,
largely because it stacks the deck against the determinist and in favor of the indeterminist.  The
determinist should not have to show that it is impossible for the behavior to be indeterministic;
the determinist only needs to show that the behavior is not in fact indeterministic.  The
indeterminist, on the other hand, needs to do more than show that indeterminism is possible.
(Both sides grant that indeterminism is possible, in any case).  At the risk of stating the obvious,
many things are possible without being actual.  Thus, the indeterminist needs to show positive
evidence in favor of indeterminism.
4. A Return to Percolation?
Perhaps in recognition of this point, Glymour shifts from an autonomous strategy to a
percolation strategy, appealing to the indeterminism of the underlying processes.  He asserts that
“[w]hatever procedure is used to generate random behavioral patterns and random searches in
particular, at some level this procedure must commonly involve the operation of cells” (2001,
526-7).  Furthermore, there is evidence, Glymour claims, that ion channels “behave
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stochastically” and that “this stochasticity appears to account for variations in cellular behavior”;
more specifically, there is evidence that the stochastic behavior of neural cells has some effect on
learning behavior (2001, 527).
However, the studies that Glymour cites simply raise more questions.  What reason do we
have to think that ion channels behave indeterministically – which is more than saying that they
behave stochastically (“stochastic behavior” being merely an observation of statistical
outcomes)?  Namely, what is the underlying quantum mechanical process?  If the ion channels
are indeterministic, how does this indeterminism percolate to the level of cellular behavior, for
neural cells in particular?  Moreover, if neural cells do behave indeterministically, then how does
this indeterminism percolate to the level of foraging behavior and search patterns?
In short, Glymour neither defends his claims for indeterministic cellular behavior nor
demonstrates the connection between the cellular behavior and the foraging behavior.  What is
needed is a discussion of the specific processes that produce foraging behavior, not just an
assertion that there must be some connection.  As Glennan (1997) points out, there are some
macro-level events that are deterministic (in spite of micro-level indeterminism) – such as
pushing a button on a Coke machine – and there are others where the indeterministic micro-level
clearly does percolate up to produce an indeterministic macro-level phenomenon – such as the
action of a Geiger counter.  So, is foraging behavior like a Coke machine or like a Geiger
counter?  (Or somewhere in between?)  Glennan's suggested method of answering questions such
as this is the similar to the one that I am urging, namely to require a detailed understanding of the
underlying causal processes.  Unless an explanation of the how the percolation from the micro-
level to the macro-level is occurring can be given, it is just the indeterminist's intuition versus the
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determinist’s intuition, with no clear reason to prefer one intuition over the other.  In other
words, Glymour has committed the "percolation fallacy" that was discussed above.
Even if I am correct that Glymour does not make a positive case for indeterminism,
however, the following challenge of Glymour's remains.  He asks, if there were indeterminism at
the micro-level (a point that the determinist's position grants), what would prevent its percolation
up to the macro-level?  If percolation to the evolutionary level of behavior patterns could happen,
but never happens, it seems as though we have a mystery on our hands:  “were it a fact that no
[indeterministic] behavioral patterns exist, it would be, as far as we can now say, simply an
accidental fact: the generalization is backed by no conceptual reason, nor by any putative laws of
nature, but rather depends for its truth on a happy sequence of evolutionary changes in which on
every occasion where an indeterministic mechanism is possible and would be advantageous, no
such mechanism ever arises” (2001, 527).  Part of Glymour’s argument here makes the point that
if an indeterministic mechanism were to arise at the "level of macro-physiology or organismal
behavior", that such a mechanism could very well be advantageous and therefore subject to
natural selection (2001, 527).  This point seems well taken, and Glymour’s own example
supports it; if random foraging behavior were an indeterministic mechanism, it would be
preserved through natural selection (just as it would be preserved if it were a deterministic
mechanism).  Sometimes randomness is advantageous, and it should not matter if it is
randomness via a deterministic mechanism or an indeterministic one.
That said, however, it remains to be seen whether the assumption underlying Glymour’s
argument is true: whether indeterministic mechanisms arise at the level of macro-physiology or
organismal behavior (in other words, do they arise in the first place for natural selection to act
upon)?  Glymour seems to be suggesting that since indeterministic percolation is possible, if
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there were no such indeterministic mechanisms it would purely be by accident.  In other words,
if there is no law to prevent them, it seems as though somewhere, sometime, they ought to occur.
If percolation is possible, then the world is not safe from indeterminism.
Here I worry that Glymour is again teetering on the edge of the percolation fallacy.  But
putting aside that worry, suppose that he is right – suppose that somewhere in the world,
indeterministic mechanisms have arisen at the level of macro-physiology or organismal behavior,
and that these mechanisms have been preserved by natural selection.  This, of course, would not
show that foraging behavior was indeterministic, nor would it show that evolution is
substantially indeterministic.  Perhaps indeterministic events at the evolutionary level are
uncommon, as with BC's example.  Or perhaps not.  My point here is that this argument will not
settle the debate either way.  A better strategy would be a more thorough analysis of the studies
on neural cells, as discussed above.
In sum, Glymour is forced to shift from the autonomous strategy to the percolation
strategy, but since he does not follow through completely on the percolation strategy, he does not
argue persuasively for the indeterminism of evolution.
5. Conclusion
So, what is the current status of the debate?  Where have we gone right, and where have we
gone wrong?  Where do we go from here?  I would argue that the debate is still unresolved, but
that the discussion has proved illuminating as to what is, and what is not, a good strategy for
settling it.  The autonomous strategy is appealing if one is worried about biology being reduced
to physics, or biology becoming the handmaiden of physics, or the like.  However, I think those
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worries are misplaced, first of all, because biology is a well-established science (currently
garnering more than its share of grant money, I might add), and second, because the issue here is
not a global reduction of evolution to QM.  The issue is rather a more limited one of whether we
need to appeal to QM to settle the question of whether evolution is indeterministic.  The problem
is that if we don't appeal to the indeterminism of QM – that is, if we don’t appeal to a point that
is granted by both sides – we end up begging the question against each other.  We end up arguing
over whether there are, or are not, hidden variables; we end up arguing over whether
indeterminism is, or is not, a better methodological assumption.  These arguments are destined to
go nowhere.  The autonomous strategy is a nonstarter.
That leaves the percolation strategy.  Here I think we can draw from what is best about the
existing arguments for indeterminism.  What is best about Stamos’s argument is that he does not
gloss over the connection between QM and point mutation; he demonstrates it.  What is best
about Glymour’s argument is that he does not gloss over the connection between foraging
strategy and evolution; he demonstrates it.  Stamos succeeds at the lower level, whereas Glymour
succeeds at the higher level.  In short, if we want to argue for the percolation of QM to evolution,
we need to demonstrate direct causal connections between the indeterministic phenomena at the
lower level and the statistical behavior at the next highest level, at all the pertinent levels
between the micro-level and the evolutionary level (as discussed above in the context of foraging
behavior).  What is compelling about BC’s example is that it provides a direct connection
between point mutation and evolution; but again, it is such an unusual example that it doesn’t
demonstrate that evolution is largely indeterministic.  That’s the final caveat; whatever
phenomenon we choose to examine, it ought to be a common one, keeping in mind that the
debate is not over the occasional percolation, but over whether evolution is significantly
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indeterministic.  Candidate phenomena for demonstrating indeterminism include Stamos’s and
Glymour’s own examples of point mutation and foraging behavior, respectively, as well as the
phenomenon of developmental noise (Millstein 2000).
Perhaps the most important lesson that we can take away from an examination of this
debate is that it should not be about whether evolution is completely deterministic or completely
indeterministic.  Rather, the crucial question is: which aspects or processes of evolution are
deterministic, which are indeterministic, and to what extent?  Once we have answered this
question (no small undertaking!), we will have advanced considerably in our understanding of
the nature of evolution.
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